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SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
In his January 2002 State of the Union address to Congress and the American people, President George W. Bush named North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as comprising an "Axis of Evil" that threatens world peace through the sponsorship of terrorism and the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, the United States has invaded and occupied Iraq, transforming that country into an entirely different sort of problem. Meanwhile, both North Korea and Iran appear to be continuing their previous policies, including efforts to develop nuclear weapons.
The United States is attempting to respond to the North Korean challenge by seeking a regional solution in cooperation with China, Japan, and South Korea. The United States has attempted to deal with Iran by pursuing a policy of containment built around economic sanctions. This policy has not prevented Iran from developing nuclear technology or sponsoring terrorist groups.
Iran is neither deterred by American military power nor persuaded by economic sanctions. The
United States needs a bigger stick or a bigger carrot, or both.
Containment can be an effective policy if the United States includes efforts to establish
and maintain constructive dialogue, avoids undue conflict, and exercises patience. Like the Soviet Union, Iran has internal contradictions that will eventually lead to internal change.
Although the United States must maintain the capability for a credible military response to
Iranian nuclear ambitions, to the extent possible the United States should pursue a policy that will allow it to establish friendly relations with Iran when change inevitably comes.
UNITED STATES INTERESTS
United States interests in regard to Iran include access to oil, security of the United States and its allies from terrorism, enforcement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and promotion of human rights. 1 Iran currently ranks as the world's second largest oil producer, after Saudi Arabia, and holds 9% of the world's oil reserves. 2 Additionally, Iran is capable of interdicting transport of oil through the Persian Gulf and could potentially cut off most oil exports from Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States. Furthermore, Iran's geographic location and welldeveloped pipeline infrastructure make it a potentially important gateway to the huge oil reserves of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea Region. Access to Caucasus and Caspian Sea oil will become a vital concern to the United States as Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula petroleum reserves are used up.
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The United States has long charged Iran with being a state sponsor of terrorism. These charges were the basis for President Bush's inclusion of Iran as a member of the "Axis of Evil." The rulers of the Arab sheikhdoms in the Gulf felt threatened by Iran. Pelletiere suggested (in 1999) that there was little hope for an improvement in the situation short of a direct American attempt to overthrow the Iraqi leadership. 16 Since that is exactly what has occurred, the Gulf oil sheikhs may be reassured, if the U.S. will now assume Iraq's former role in frustrating Iran's regional ambitions. In fact, with the removal of the Iraqi regime, containment is no longer "dual,"
and the U.S. has an excellent occasion to reconsider its policy toward Iran.
ALTERNATIVE POLICIES
The United States has several options for dealing with Iran. Broadly, they are overcommitted. 17 The threat of major military operations against Iran therefore does not appear to be imminent and therefore does not represent a credible deterrent to Iranian policy. In fact, it may have the opposite effect of encouraging Iran to hasten its nuclear program in order to develop nuclear weapons before the United States is ready to attack.
ENGAGEMENT AS A POLICY OPTION
The first alternative to containment is engagement. Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
CONTAINMENT RECONSIDERED
The United States' Cold War containment policy toward the Soviet Union originated as a coherent policy with George Kennan in 1946. In his famous Long Telegram, Kennan argued that if the Soviet Union was prevented from expanding its influence, it would eventually collapse of its own "internal contradictions." The collapse did not come until nearly 45 years later, but it came. Containment is a policy that requires patience.
Given patience, are there "internal contradictions" in the Iranian regime that will lead to its collapse? The answer is yes, and the United States may be in a position to create conditions that will highlight the contradictions. The contradictions have to do with competing Shi'a philosophies about the proper role of religious leaders in government. The current stagnation in Iranian government reflects the contradiction. The Shi'a community in Iraq may become a model of how to overcome the contradiction. When the Caliphs martyred the eleventh Imam, his son, the twelfth Imam was miraculously hidden away, someday to return as the Mahdi, a messianic figure who will reestablish rightly guided leadership of the Islamic world.
TWO VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN GOVERNMENT
In the absence of the Twelfth Imam, the Shi'a Ulama (religious establishment) became scholars and spiritual advisors, interpreting Islamic law but generally abstaining from politics.
Abstinence from politics was at least partly a matter of necessity-early Shi'a rebellions turned out badly, forcing the Shi'a minority to turn inward. Under the circumstances, the Shi'as adopted the view that the Ulama should not seek political power, but rather should concentrate on interpreting Islamic law to guide individuals in their day-to-day lives. 32 In part, the Ulama justified this stance by noting that politics involves deceit and compromise, and the Ulama would taint itself by becoming involved.
The role of the mujtahid was ijtihad-the determination of legal judgment in matters of religion. 33 "Islam" means submission-submission to the will of God, but also submission to a set of social rules, laid out in the Quran, that govern daily life. Islam is much more prescriptive than other religions about how its adherents should live, prescribing definite laws for every major human activity. 34 However, the Quran cannot address every possible human activity or situation, and therefore it must be supplemented by other sources of Islamic doctrine. These include the example set by the Prophet's own actions and interpretations by religious scholars.
Shi'a scholars studied the Quran and the life of the Prophet to develop a body of Islamic law.
Religious scholars in the leading Shi'a centers gathered in seminaries to study and 40 Khomeini's criticisms of un-Islamic (and therefore unjust) government were aimed primarily at the Shah of Iran and made him a rallying point for opponents of the regime.
After the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Khomeini's followers established the Islamic Republic of Iran based on Khomeini's principles, with Khomeini himself installed as supreme leader.
ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT IN IRAN
Under the new constitution adopted after the fall of the Shah, Iran's government consists of a Supreme Leader, or Rahbar, an executive branch under an elected president, an elected legislature, an assembly of experts, a guardian council, and a judiciary consisting of scholars trained in Shi'a jurisprudence.
The Supreme Leader is a "just and pious jurist" selected by the Assembly of Experts as best qualified to lead the nation. Khomeini himself was first to serve in this role, and he designated his aide Ali Khamene'i to succeed him. Khamene'i was selected (and after Khomeini's death, duly confirmed by the Assembly of Experts) based on his loyalty to Khomeini's ideals, rather than his credentials as a Shi'a jurisprudent. 41 Khanene'i was promoted from hojat al Islam to ayatollah only just before becoming Supreme Leader; he has yet to rise to the rank of Grand Ayatollah. 42 The senior Iranian ayatollah at the time of the succession was Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, whose commitment to Islamic government was suspect.
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The Supreme Leader appoints the members of the Council of Guardians, chief judges of the judicial branch, and commanders of the military and the Pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards.
He also approves all candidates for the Presidency. 44 He is de facto commander in chief of all military forces and controls the state security forces.
The Assembly of Experts is directly elected for eight years (1990, 1998, 2006, etc) from among candidates approved by the Council of Guardians. Its role is to appoint, oversee, and if necessary dismiss the Supreme Leader. Since the Supreme Leader effectively controls its membership, the Assembly's first role is the only one of significance. 45 The President of Iran is directly elected for four years (1993, 1997, 2001, 2005, etc) . He is the head of the executive branch and presides over the cabinet. The legislature is called the
Majlis-e Shora-ye Islamic (Islamic Consultive Assembly) or simply Majlis. It is made up of 270 representatives chosen by district in direct elections to serve for four years (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, etc) . Five seats are reserved for religious minorities: one each for the Jews, Zoroastrians, and Assyrian Christians, and two for Armenians. The remaining 265 seats are reserved for representatives who have a deep belief in Islam. The Majlis debates bills placed before it by the government or at least 15 members, approves treaties, confirms cabinet members, and may authorize martial law for up to 30 days. 46 The elected President and Legislature give Iranian government the appearance of democratic form, but power rests neither in the President nor in the Majlis.
The Guardian Council, together with the Supreme Leader, is the real power in Iranian 
CHALLENGES TO ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT
The Islamic Government in Iran has not been a tremendous success. Khomeini's "perfect politics," free of dispute and compromise, have led to a stagnant and unresponsive government. Montazeri, Iran's senior ayatollah, rejected the absolute power of the Rahbar on the grounds that Islam forbids the supremacy of fallible humans. 52 Others followed Montazeri's example, and even in the seminaries of Qom students openly questioned the role of religious leaders in government. Ordinary Iranians also have complained, bringing back the traditional argument that mixing politics and religion degrades religion without improving politics.
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AYATOLLAH SISTANI ON THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN GOVERNMENT
The traditional Shi'a view on the role of religion in government is embodied in the teaching 58 The movement of ideas and scholars between Najaf and Qom is not unusual. During Saddam's reign, the number of students at Najaf declined from several thousand to a few hundred as the center of Shi'a learning shifted from to Qom. With the fall of Saddam, new students are flocking back to Najaf. 59 Some will later return to Iran.
WHAT SHOULD BE THE U.S. POLICY FOR IRAN?
The 
